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THE AUTOMATED ADMINSTRATIVE STATE:
A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY
Ryan Calo* & Danielle Keats Citron**
The legitimacy of the administrative state is premised on our faith in agency
expertise. Despite their extra-constitutional structure, administrative agencies
have been on firm footing for a long time in reverence to their critical role in
governing a complex, evolving society. They are delegated enormous power
because they respond expertly and nimbly to evolving conditions.
In recent decades, state and federal agencies have embraced a novel mode of
operation: automation. Agencies rely more and more on software and algorithms
in carrying out their delegated responsibilities. The automated administrative
state, however, is demonstrably riddled with concerns. Legal challenges regarding
the denial of benefits and rights—from travel to disability—have revealed a
pernicious pattern of bizarre and unintelligible outcomes.
Scholarship to date has explored the pitfalls of automation with a particular frame,
asking how we might ensure that automation honors existing legal commitments
such as due process. Missing from the conversation are broader, structural
critiques of the legitimacy of agencies that automate. Automation throws away the
expertise and nimbleness that justify the administrative state, undermining the very
case for the existence and authority of agencies.
Yet the answer is not to deny agencies access to technology. This article points
toward a positive vision of the administrative state that adopts tools only when
they enhance, rather than undermine, the underpinnings of agency legitimacy.

INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Arkansas Department of Human Services decided to make
a change. Rather than having a nurse visit disabled residents at home to
assess their care needs, the agency hired a software company to build an
algorithm that would automate the determination. The agency hoped to save
money. Instead, administrators found themselves in federal court.
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Arkansas’ new system proved cruel and illogical. The Kafkaesque
system decreased the home care of an amputee because he had “no foot
problems.”1 As a result of the automated system’s dysfunction, severely
disabled Medicaid recipients were left alone without access to food, toilet,
and medicine for hours on end. Nearly half of Arkansas Medicaid recipients
were negatively affected.2 Obtaining relief from the software-based
outcome was all but impossible.3
A federal court enjoined the state agency from using the automated
system after a damning narrative emerged. Agency officials admitted they
did not know how the system worked.4 The authors of the algorithm and the
software vendors were similarly unable, or unwilling, to provide an
explanation.5 On cross-examination in open court, the agency and its
partners admitted not only that they failed to detect the system errors that
the litigants uncovered, but that in many instances they lacked the expertise
necessary to do so.6
Administrative agencies are a constitutional anomaly. They are
permitted to exist, we are told, because the world is complicated and
requires expertise and discretion beyond the capacity of legislatures. 7 And
yet more and more agency officials are admitting—sometimes in open
court—that they possess neither. Agencies are invested with governing
authority (over the objections of many) due to their unique capabilities and
knowledge and now they are turning that authority to machines.

Kevin De Liban, “Algorithm Absurdities—RUGs as Implemented in Arkansas,”
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1t2ACNXr7D8JBSLja7F3UC3zkl_qu-xg7., on file
with the authors).
1

Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs., 60 CV-17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2018);
see Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9,
2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice).
2

3

Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE
VERGE
(Mar.
21,
2018
9:00
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansascerebral-palsy.
4

Excerpted Trial Transcript at 20, 31, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 27, 2016).
5

Excerpted Trial Transcript at 20, 31, Testimony of Brant Fries, Jacobs v. Gillespie,
No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016).
6

Id.

7

See infra, Part II.A.
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Since the turn of the millennium, inadequately resourced federal and
state agencies have turned to automation for a variety of reasons but notably
to contain costs.8 A little over a decade ago, the problems associated with
automating public-benefits determinations came into view. In the public
benefits arena, programmers embedded erroneous rules into the systems,
more often by mistake or inattention.9 Systems cut, denied, or terminated
individuals’ benefits without explanation in violation of due process
guarantees.10
Challenging automated decisions was difficult because systems lacked
audit trails that could help excavate the reason behind the decisions.11
Judicial review had limited value in light of the strong psychological
tendency to defer to a computer’s findings. These problems affected
hundreds of thousands of people (often the most vulnerable), wasted
hundreds of millions of dollars, and produced expensive litigation. Agencies
spent millions to purchase automated systems. And they spent millions
more to fix the problems those systems created.12
Despite these concerns, agencies have continued to adopt—often via
third-party vendors—automated systems that defy explanation even by their
creators. New York officials are still using the defective algorithm litigated
in Arkansas despite its clear deficiencies.13 Idaho’s health and welfare
8

As of 2004, 52 of 125 federal agencies surveyed by the Government Accountability
Office reported the use of data mining, defined as “as the application of database
technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—to uncover hidden
patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of
future results.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING:
FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 1 (2004). Data mining has its perils but
differs from automation. We further distinguish the use of modeling for planning versus the
automatization of agency tasks in Part IV.
9

For instance, the Colorado Benefits Management System had been making decisions
using over 900 rules that had never been subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
CMBS terminated Medicaid of breast cancer patients based on income and asset limits
unauthorized by federal or state law, required eligibility workers to ask applicants if they
were “beggars” despite the absence of any legal mandate to do so, denied food stamps to
individuals with prior drug convictions in violation of Colorado law. Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1253, 1276–77 (2008).
10

Id.

11

Id. at 1253, 1276–77 (2008).

12

Id.

13

VERGE

Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE
(Mar.
21,
2018
9:00
AM),
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agency commissioned its own budget software tool to allocate the number
of hours of home care for disabled Medicaid recipients.14 That algorithmic
tool also drastically cut individuals’ home care hours without meaningful
explanation and faced challenge in court.
The pattern is hardly limited to health administration. Stage agencies
have deployed algorithms and software to evaluate public school teachers in
Texas, to assess and terminate unemployment benefits in Michigan, and to
evaluate the risks posed by criminal defendants in D.C., Wisconsin, and
elsewhere.15
Nor is the pattern limited to the states. The Department of Homeland
Security has long deployed an algorithmic system—the so-called No Fly
List—to try to prevent terrorists from traveling. This data-matching
program has misidentified many individuals, in part because it uses crude
algorithms that could not distinguish between similar names. Thousands of
people got caught in the dragnet, including government officials, military
veterans, and toddlers.16 The U.S. government would not say if one was on
the list and provided no explanation for no-fly decisions.
An increasingly wide variety of federal agencies leverage algorithms
and automation in carrying out their statutorily committed duties. The IRS,
SEC, U.S. Postal Service, and myriad other federal agencies are using
machines in one manner or another.17 A recent report nearly half of all
agencies use, or are investigating the use of, artificial intelligence.18 Just last
year an Executive Order directed all federal agencies to explore the

https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansascerebral-palsy.
14

K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp.3d 703, 708 (D. Idaho 2016).

15

Lecher, supra note, at.

16

BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 261 (2017).

17

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1154 (2017). For a recent and
thorough review of federal use of algorithms, see David Freeman Engstrom et al.,
Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies
(2020),
https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AIReport.pdf/.
Id., at 15-20 (“[C]ontrary to popular perceptions presuming government agencies
uniformly rely on antiquated systems and procedures, many agencies have in fact
experimented with [artificial intelligence or machine learning].”
18
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potential efficiencies of AI.19
Agencies are listening. A January 2019 request for proposals from the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services sought a contract to
coordinate artificial intelligence procurement, descripting the contract as
“the next logical step to integrating [intelligence automation and artificial
intelligence] into all phases of government operations.”20
The turn toward automation in recent decades has not gone
unchallenged. Scholars have repeatedly pushed back against governmental
use of software and algorithms to arrive at decisions and goals previously
carried out by people. “The human race’s rapid development of computer
technology,” observed Paul Schwartz thirty years ago in a related context,
“has not been matched by a requisite growth in the ability to control these
new machines.”21 In 2008, one of us (Citron) offered an extensive
framework for evaluating and responding to agency reliance on
technology.22 In recent years this discourse has burgeoned into a full-blown
literature spanning multiple disciplines.23
Yet the challenges posed to the automated administrative state to date
tend to proceed from a very specific frame: the problem of automation
arises when a machine has taken over a task previously committed to a
human such that guarantees of transparency, accountability, and due process
fall away.24 This frame follows a tendency in law and technology generally
to focus on how machines that substitute for humans undermine certain
values or rights. The discussion of how best to restore due process in light

19

Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, Exec. Order No. 13,859,
84 Fed. Reg. 3,967 (Feb. 11, 2019).
20

[add cite], cited in, Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as
Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781
(2019).
21
Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1322 (1992).
22

See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1301–13 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
355, 371–81 (2008).
23

See infra, Part I.

24

An important, related literature examines the ways automation exacerbates
inequality or entrenches bias. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING EQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 180-88 (2018); Solon Barocas
& Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. LAW REV. 671 (2016).
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of computer-driven decision-making is an example. The debate around
liability for driverless cars is another.
The 2017 article Accountable Algorithms is illustrative of the literature.
“Important decisions that were historically made by people are now made
by computer systems,” the authors write, and “accountability mechanisms
and legal standards that govern decision processes have not kept pace with
technology.”25 In other words, many consequential government decisions
were once made by people, attended by accountability mechanisms suited to
people. Now that machines make these decisions, law or technology must
change to restore the rights and values afforded individuals under the
previous arrangement. The authors suggest legal and technical mechanisms
to restore the status quo ex ante. Recently, some scholars and activists have
called for a ban or moratorium on the use of automation unless or until such
issues can be addressed.26
We have participated in the project of restoring rights and values
displaced by technology for some time. The aim of this article is to
foreground a distinct question: whether automation by agencies threatens to
erode long-standing justifications for having agencies at all.
On the standard account, legislatures delegate authority to agencies
because they must. The Constitution commits to Congress the authority to
make laws; the world has become so complex and dynamic, however, that
Congress must delegate its authority to administrative agencies. The
famously “functionalist” rationale for delegation rests on the affordances of
bureaucracies, particularly their ability to accrue expertise and the prospect

25

Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017).

26
See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6, 44–54 (2019) (suggesting that automation in the
legal field should be limited to technology that complements, rather than replaces, an
attorney’s skills); Nathan Sheard, The Fight Against Government Face Surveillance: 2019
Year
in
Review,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Dec.
31,
2019),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/year-fight-against-government-face-surveillance
(discussing local and state bans on the use of facial recognition technology and current
concerns related to ongoing use by the FBI and its state and federal partners); Jane Wester,
NY State Senate Bill Would Ban Police Use of Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y.L.J.
(Jan. 27, 2020, 2:36 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/01/27/ny-statesenate-bill-would-ban-police-use-of-facial-recognition-technology/ (describing a proposed
N.Y. State Senate bill which would prohibit law enforcement from using facial recognition
and some other biometric surveillance tools and “create a task force to examine how to
regulate biometric technology in the future”).
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of flexible and nimble responses to complex problems.27 Courts bless this
extra-Constitutional arrangement and defer to agency decision-making for
very similar reasons.28
Mounting evidence suggests that agencies are turning to systems in
which they hold no expertise, and which foreclose discretion, individuation,
and reason-giving almost entirely. The automated administrative state is
less and less the imperfect compromise between the text of the Constitution
and the realities of contemporary governance. At some point, the trend
toward throwing away expertise, discretion, and flexibility with both hands
strains the very rationale for creating and maintaining an administrative
state.29 This is especially true where, as often, the very same processes of
automation also frustrate the guardrails put in place by Congress and the
courts to ensure agency accountability.
The question we ask in this article is not how to restore the status quo ex
ante given that machines have supplanted people. We ask instead whether
technology obligates a fundamental reexamination of why Congress is
permitted to hand off power to agencies in the first place.
The new direction we advocate is critical but ultimately constructive.
We do not recommend the dissolution of the administrative state, which has
turned to automation largely in response to a hostile political economy. Nor
do we hope to foreclose the use of technology by state or federal agencies.
Our ultimate recommendation is that agencies should consciously select
technology to the extent its new affordances enhance, rather than
undermine, the rationale that underpins the administrative state. This would
be so even absent a looming legitimacy crisis. We observe that, far from
demand a return to the status quo, new technology invites us to heighten
and extend our expectations of what government can offer its citizens. Such
examples exist in the literature and media; we believe they deserve greater
attention and collect them here.

27

See Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 PA. L. REV. 633, 635 (2018)
(“Looking to judicial opinions or academic writing, the dominant explanation of and
justification for the administrative state is based on agencies’ expertise and expansive
rulemaking and adjudicatory capacities.”). See also infra, Part II.A.
See Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835 (1986).
(referencing “certain ideas about government and knowledge … which would become
standard justifications for administrative government”). See also infra, Part II.A.
28

Said another way, why wouldn’t a Congress favorable to automation simply contract
directly with software providers to carry out its legislative will?
29
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Our argument proceeds as follows. Part I traces the legal literature
around agency automation to date, indicating certain limitations in the
approach scholars (including us) have taken in framing the issues. Parts II
and III advance the novel critique that, taken to its logical conclusion,
agency automation undermines not only constitutional and administrative
procedural guarantees, but the very justification for having an
administrative state in the first place.30 This argument relies for evidence on
recent litigation that has surfaced the dearth of expertise and the lack of
responsiveness and flexibility around automation in open court at least at
the state level.
Part IV begins the complex project of resuscitating the justification for
technology-enabled agencies. In particular, we call attention to the prospect
that advances in artificial intelligence—thoughtfully deployed—have the
potential to improve agency decision-making and planning. Agencies are
increasingly able to “model” instead of “muddle” through, and could use
technology to help meet societies rising expectations for impartiality and
responsiveness.31
I. REPLACING VALUES COMPROMISED
There is a growing sense of unease as machines intrude upon
humankind’s most important institutions. Scholarship over the past decade
have explored the impacts of automating various facets of criminal, civil,
and administrative justice.32 The consequences include the erosion of due
30

Such an argument has been mentioned in passing, first by the authors and later by
others, but has yet to be developed into a full-throated account.
31

See infra, Part IV. The reference is to Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of
‘Muddling Through,’ 19 Pub. Admin. R. 79 (1959).
32

See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P.
Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE. J. L. TECH. 103, 115–18
(2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 1249
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. L. FORUM 355
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2014); Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA
L. Rev. 54 (2019); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633
(2017); Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, ; Paul Schwartz, Data
Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response
to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1322 (1992); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803
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process guarantees, the reification of race, class, and gender bias, and the
undermining of structural safeguards. On the standard account, the “black
box” of algorithmic justice simultaneously propagates error and bias while
providing the veneer of objectivity.33 Tasks once performed by officials and
juries is now undertaken by machines. And procedural mechanisms of
transparency and accountability have not kept pace.
This inquiry has a cyclical quality. Writing in 1991, Paul Schwartz
chronicled the growing dependence of the administrative state on the
collection, storage, and processing of data using computers. Organizing his
critique around two case studies, Schwartz argued that a newfound reliance
on computers and data threatened the administration of “bureaucratic
justice.”34 In particular, the “seductively precise” conclusions of machines
function as objective criteria that lessen the perceived need for subjective
judgments by people.35 Computers, as deployed by the government, resist
accountability and rob participants of their dignity, largely by removing
their capacity to understand the processes to which they have been
subjected.
Twenty years prior, Lawrence Tribe famously dismissed Bayesian
approaches to evidence as “trial by mathematics.”36 Tracing a line between
the practice of numerology in the Middle Ages and the American reverence
for statistics in the 1970s, Tribe walked through the various problems
associated with introducing probabilistic evidence into court to establish
facts. Tribe cast mathematics as the original black box, incapable of deep
scrutiny by the trier of fact. He noted the varied ways mathematical
formulas seduce the unfamiliar juror or judge into a perception of
objectivity. Tribe bemoaned the dehumanizing changes mathematical
methods bring to the very “character of the trial process itself.”37
Each of these issues is, or should be, relevant today.38 Schwartz’s case
(2014).
33

E.g., FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015).

34
Schwartz, supra, note., at. The reference is to JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC
JUSTICE (1983).
35

Schwartz, supra, note., at.

36

Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
37

Id.

38

Substitute “algorithm” for “math” and Trial By Algorithm could easily appear as a

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590

10

THE AUTOMATED ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

[27-Feb-20

studies of family aid and child welfare enforcement mirror almost precisely
the case studies animating Automating Inequality, a celebrated book from
2017.39 The very issue that sparked the trial by mathematics debate—a
prosecutor’s efforts in People v. Collins to link an interracial couple to a
crime using statistics—closely parallels the now infamous ProPublica story
on racial bias in algorithmic risk assessment for sentencing.40 Whatever its
antecedents, the puzzle of how changes in technology interact with the
dispensation of justice is once again timely and critical.
Our specific focus here is the administrative state’s turn toward
automation. To date, this conversation has tended to foreground procedural
due process—i.e., the process the state owes individuals before depriving
them of life, liberty, or property—as well as challenges to rulemaking and
open-sunshine commitments.
Schwartz, in 1991, focused on the ways that computer and data-driven
decision-making thwarted process values, such as privacy, justice, and
autonomy. Years later, one of us (Citron) highlighted the mismatch behind
the automated state and procedural guarantees, arguing for a new form of
“technological due process” that would restore accountability and
transparency to the system.41 This work observed, for instance, that the
Matthews calculus for due process was ill-suited to automated systems
because it assumed that interventions would be cheap in the individual
instance but expensive at scale. In reality, a deep vetting of agency software
is expensive at the front end but the benefits propagate across the entire
system at the end. Such vetting is crucial because programming mistakes
constituted ultra vires assumption of rulemaking power without legally
required notice and public participation.
Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, in 2014, explore the prospect of
“procedural data due process” to mitigate the tendency of data-driven
analyses to “evade or marginalize traditional privacy protections and
title in volume 134 of the Harvard Law Review. You’re welcome to the title.
39

VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING EQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE,
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 180-88 (2018).
40

Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically
Inevitable, Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016, 4:44 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematicallyinevitable-researchers-say.
41

Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355 (2008).
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frameworks.”42 Crawford and Schultz draw from history, scholarship, and
precedent to identify the elements of a fair hearing, seeking to translate
those commitments into a world rife with analytics.43 More recent work by
Crawford and Schultz focuses on accountability for third-party vendors,
suggesting that algorithms and artificial intelligence be considered state
action for purposes of constitutional challenges.44
Joshua Kroll and an interdisciplinary team of co-authors, noted above,
decry the disconnect between decision-making systems—such as the
algorithmic processes used by the IRS to select whom to audit or by
immigration authorities to distribute visas—and the accountability
mechanism that purport to govern them. They explore techniques by which
“authorities can demonstrate . . . that automated decisions comply with key
standards of legal fairness.”45 They offer “procedural regularity,” which
partly draws upon “the Fourteenth Amendment principle of procedural due
process,” as the guiding principle for the redesign of agency systems.46
Recent work by Deidre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger thinks
systematically about “procurement as policy,” whereby agencies hide
policies changes in harder to review decisions about the purchase of
machine learning systems.47 According the authors, “these systems
frequently displace discretion previously held by either policymakers
charged with ordering that discretion, or individual front-end government
employees on whose judgment governments previously relied.”48 Mulligan
and Bamberger offer a variety of techniques by which to reintroduce the
human expertise, discretion, and political accountability that machines have
displaced.
42
Kate Crawford & Jason Shultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014).
43

Id., at 121–28 (2014).

44

Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV.
1941 (2019).
45

Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 675 (2017).

46

Id, at 633, 675 (2017). The authors also explore technical means by which to assure
fidelity to the “substantive policy choice” of nondiscrimination. Id. at 678–95.
47

Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy:
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2019). But
see Engstrom et al., supra note, at 15 (finding that “[c]ontrary to much of the literature’s
fixation on the procurement of algorithms through private contracting, over half of
applications (84 use cases, or 53%) were built in-house…”).
48

Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note, at.
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These wise interventions, and many more, proceed from the assumption
that the substitution of technology for people reduces transparency,
accountability, or some other value. Constitutions and statutes, after all,
were written on the assumption that people, not machines, would make
decisions and execute most consequential tasks. Imagine, for example, a top
presidential candidate is a self-aware machine built in 2050. Would the
Constitution, written by and about human beings, require that our robot wait
to become president until 2085, making it the requisite 35 years of age?49
The substitution approach represents, in a sense, the legacy of the
thinking of cyberlaw pioneer Lawrence Lessig. The ascendance of the
commercial internet in the 1990s, which appeared to stand apart from
existing social structures, led early theorists to predict an end to
authoritarianism. Lessig famously rejected this premise, predicting instead
that our collective mediation by technology would shepherd in an era of
exquisite control by governments and firms as they come to understand the
new levers of power.50
In making his case, Lessig developed at least two sets of ideas that
continue to guide law and technology analysis. First, Lessig postulated that
law is only one of four “modalities” of regulation available to powerful
institutions to channel behavior—markets, norms, and architecture also
represent means of exerting control.51 Even if a virtual or geographically
dispersed community cannot be reached directly by statutes or court orders,
the community is nevertheless governed by the software, hardware, and
networks that constitute their underlying architecture. Second, Lessig
understood the interaction between law and cyberspace as a function of
“latent ambiguities,” i.e., legal puzzles revealed only when a change in
technology alters human habits and capabilities.52 Although less remarked
49

See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.”). The example is adapted from Ryan Calo, Much Ado About Robots, Cato
UNBOUND (April 11, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/04/11/ryan-calo/muchado-about-robots.
50

LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999).

51

Id. See also Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661
(1998) (first articulating the four modalities of regulation as law, norms, markets, and
architecture).
52

LESSIG, CODE, supra note, at. See also James H. Moor, What is Computer Ethics?,
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than Lessig’s mantra that “code is law,” the notion that new technologies
reveal latent ambiguities in the law informed a generation of technology law
scholars.
Lessig’s approach was and remains groundbreaking; it is also deeply
intuitive to lawyers, already steeped in analogic reasoning and problem
solving. We should not be surprised, therefore, to see the approach reflected
across the legal academy decades later. We certainly should not be surprised
to see the approach reflected in analyses of algorithms and artificial
intelligence.
These technologies fascinate precisely for their ability to substitute for
humans. The law assumes that humans will drive cars. Now robots do.
Scholars, ourselves included, ask how we might reconstitute law, markets,
norms, or technology to address the myriad latent ambiguities revealed
when things start to act like people. There is the new practice that
challenges existing legal assumptions. There is the resolution by code or
law that restores us to the status quo. While there are certainly outliers,
much law and technology scholarship follow this basic pattern.
We aim to challenge this long-standing approach. The problem with the
substitution frame is two-fold. By focusing on the specific guarantees that
new technology displaces, the substitution approach inevitably misses the
opportunity to reexamine first principles. Critics of algorithmic decisionmaking have largely assumed the prospect of restoring the status quo
through specific alternations to legal and technical design, rather than
foreground broader questions of legitimacy.53
The substitution approach also fails to consider whether the existing
status quo is sufficient in light of new technical capabilities. Analyses of
driverless car liability have largely assumed that people would still own
individual vehicles but that they would not drive them.54 But the
16 Metaphilosophy 266 (1985) (discussing how technology creates “policy vacuums”).
53

Cf. Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where fairness fails: data, algorithms, and the limits of
antidiscrimination discourse, INFO., COMM. & SOC. 22:7, 900-915 (2019) (arguing in the
context of antidiscrimination that explorations of algorithmic bias “have tended to admit,
but place beyond the scope of analysis, important structural and social concerns related to
the realization of data justice”).
54

E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and
Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA.
L. REV. 127 (2019) (addressing a gap in tort law occasioned by substituting machines for
human drivers).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590

14

THE AUTOMATED ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

[27-Feb-20

technologies that underpin driverless cars could, for example, lead to a
wholesale reexamination of mobility and transportation.55 Perhaps the
ascendance of artificial intelligence means that agencies should be held to
higher standards and asked to pursue greater or different values.
II. JUSTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
As the previous part describes, challenges to agency automation tend to
admonish the government for supplanting procedural rights and values by
substituting a machine decision-maker for a human official.
Recommendations take the form of changes to law or design that restore the
status quo ex ante by reinstating the ability of subjects to understand, shape,
and challenge the rules and decisions to which they are subject.
What follows is an argument that, in addition to the valuable work of
restoring lapsed or eroded safeguards, critics should pull at the threads of
the arguments justifying the automated administrative state to assess
whether the entire tapestry unravels. That is a crucial missed opportunity,
one we aim to repair.
A. Responding to Agency Skepticism: Governance in a Complex World
American administrative agencies have faced skepticism almost from
their inception.56 The reasons for skepticism are heterogeneous and
evolving. Charges against agencies have run the gamut from
overzealousness to bureaucratic inefficiency to agency capture and
politicization.57
55

See Ryan Calo, Commuting to Mars: A Response to Professors Abraham and Rabin,
105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 84 (2019) (critiquing the authors’ assumption that autonomous
transportation would continue to involve individual vehicle ownership).
56

See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civil Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State,
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). Note that in the discussion that follows, we are describing
federal agencies and administrative law. State agencies are subject to analogous if slightly
different constraints. See Arthur Ear Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 297 (1986) (“When the states developed their administrative law,
they adopted many of the general concepts embodied in the 1946 Administrative Procedure
Act.”). Meanwhile, the examples that animate this paper are, by and large, state agency
examples where existing litigation has focused and generated a record. Our argument
therefore makes at least one of two speculative assumptions: (1) that the case for the
legitimacy of state agencies mirrors that of federal agencies or (2) that the trend in
automation at the federal level exemplifies similar dynamics as the states.
57

E.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
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But the deepest critique of the administrative state came early and never
left—namely, that administrative agencies by their very nature violate the
text and spirit of the Constitution in exercising and even comingling powers
committed to separate branches.58
There are distinct yet related aspects to this challenge. The first is that,
because the Constitution vests “all legislative powers” in a Congress, the
legislature is not free to delegate its authority to a separate body—a
principle known as non-delegation.59 The second concern is that, by vesting
agencies with the authority to make, enforce, and interpret rules, Congress
violates the doctrine of separation of powers implicit in the tripartite
structure of government. Like the mythological Fates who spin, measure,
and cut, each branch of government has a separate power than the other—
the power to create, enforce, and interpret law.60 Agencies by their nature
elide these powers together.
Bolstering these concerns is the contested observation that agencies
permit Congress to insulate itself from political fallout. 61 Rather than
confront hard policy choices squarely as part of an open political process,
the existence of agencies permits Congress to forward difficult decisions to
the bureaucrats, many of whom are career officials who are largely
insulated from the wrath of constituents. If the agency’s actions garner
public approval, then Congress and the President can claim credit. If the
actions or inactions of the agency garner scorn, Congress can distance itself
from the decision and even haul in the offending official for excoriation for
good measure. Open agency processes also become a lightning rod for
special interests, who are then less likely to trouble Congress with their
complains and demands.
Since 1935, when the Supreme Court struck down two broad
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
58

ADRIAN VERMEULE, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of
Constitutional and Ordinary Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
at *3 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015),
59

Id.

Id. The Fates or “Moirai” are physical manifestations of the concept of destiny that
appear in HESIOD, THEOGONY and elsewhere as part of Greco-Roman lore.
60

61

SCHOENBROD, supra, note. For a well-known counterpoint, see Jerry Mashaw,
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. LAW, ECON. &
ORG. 81 (1984).
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delegations of power to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration
under the National Industrial Recover Act of 1933, few nondelegation
challenges have gotten much traction.62 All the Constitution seems to
require of Congress today is that it lay down an “intelligible principle” in
the agency’s organic statute that guides agency action.63 Such a principle
can be broad indeed: the Federal Trade Commission Act charges the FTC
with policing against “unfair and deceptive practice.”64 Congress need only
provide the agency with an adequate sense of its will and expectations and
agency officials are off and running. For present purposes, the precise
contours of the intelligible principle test are less interesting than the
rationale for upholding what is today a massive administrative state
touching most aspects of daily life.
Proponents of agencies then and now have countered skeptics with great
force.65 Some note that while the Constitution does not endorse the
establishment of (many) agencies, nor does it expressly forbid them. Nearly
all proponents draw from a similar set of positive justifications for the
administrative state that came ultimately to be reflected in Supreme Court
precedent. Foremost among these justifications is that managing the modern
world is beyond the institutional capability of Congress alone. Agencies are
anomalous but necessary because the world is more complex and dynamic
than the Framers might have imagined.66
Several related insights follow. It follows that Congress must obtain
assistance from another entity to carry out its statutorily committed
responsibilities. Protecting the Jews of Progue was beyond the capacity of
62

See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.LA. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Supreme Court caselaw also prohibits
Congress from using administrative constructs to reserve for itself a power the Constitution
does not commit to it (e.g., appointment), limiting the constitutionally assigned power of
another branch (e.g., removal), or bypassing a constitutional mandate (e.g., bicameralism
and presentment). INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
63
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, __ (1989), quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., &
Co. v. Untied States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). Changes in the composition of the Supreme
Court, especially the appointment of noted delegation skeptic Justice Brent Kavanaugh,
may eventually lead the Court to reexamine this doctrine.
64

Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §41(5).

65

[string cite]

66

See GILLIAN E. METZGER, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of
Constitutional and Ordinary Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
at *9-10 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015).For example,
the first Congress decided it needed to choose where post offices would be built.
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the Rabbi ben Bezalel; legend has it that he had to fashion a golem.67 Then
too, the entity must be positioned to accrue adequate expertise to manage a
complex industry, challenge, or societal environment. And the entity must
have sufficient flexibility—indeed, the discretion—to individuate its
policies by context and respond to changes on the ground in our dynamic
contemporary world.
The Supreme Court has endorsed each of these precepts on multiple
occasions. Famously in Mistretta v. United States, the Court announced:
our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.68
The functionalist position has clear intuitive appeal. Congress is
comprised of a few hundred representatives and their staff. For the
legislature not only to become expert in railway travel, disease control, or
nuclear energy, but to keep up with changes in these fields and deal with
exceptions or special circumstances, seems fair beyond any single body’s
institutional capacity. Rather, Congress must be permitted to create a series
of entities, each capable of mastering a particular domain and of making
informed choices within that context. Indeed, the position must have clear
intuitive appeal, given that the Constitution just as clearly vests “All
legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress.69
The allowances enabling the administrative state occur against the
important backdrop of structural safeguards. In 1946, in reaction to the
explosion of agency activity under FDR during the New Deal, reformers in
Congress forced through the Administrative Procedure Act as a
compromise.70 This statute lays out the structure under which federal
agencies must operate and instructions to the courts on how to review
them.71 Many agency activities fly under the radar of administrative law as
67

RICHARD D.E. BURTON, PRAGUE: A CULTURAL HISTORY 62-69 (2003).

68

488 U.S. 361, __.

69

See U.S. CONST. art. 1.

70
See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., et al., 425 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1978) (describing the origins of the APA).
71

The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. The APA has
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non-binding. These include reports, convenings, and myriad other actions
that have no direct impact on the primary conduct (behavior) of regulated
entities or the public. But when agencies act upon the world or bind their
own conduct in particular ways, they are subject to procedural constraints
and open to judicial review.
The APA provides for two major means of binding agency action:
rulemaking, whereby the agency formulates prospective regulations, and
adjudications, whereby the agency applies those rules to particular regulated
entities.72 Most rulemaking and adjudication are in conception “informal”
and hence it is up to agency, largely in its discretion, to set out the
procedures.73 But even so, Congress and the courts generally require
agencies making rules to solicit stakeholder comments on those rules and
provide detailed explanations of their bases.74 Similarly, agency
adjudications must satisfy the strictures of due process and generate a
sufficient record to as to be subject to meaningful judicial review.75
Judicial review of administrative actions is highly complex. The inquiry
involves a blend of common law, constitutional law, and statutory
interpretation. Broadly speaking, courts defer to agency interpretations of
their own organic statutes unless congressional will is clear, the agency’s
interpretation is unreasonable, or deference is otherwise inappropriate.76
Courts give arguably greater deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
own duly-promulgated regulations, which generally will control unless
clearly erroneous.77
Under the APA, the DNA of the federal administrative state, courts
remained nearly unchanged over six decades, although it was amended to include a
transparency provision known as the Freedom of Information Act. Id., § 552 (2009).
72

5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553, 554.

73

Id., at § 553.

74
Id. (requiring notice, comment, and statement). See also Danielle Keats Citron,
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, ___ (2008) (discussing how
software undermines informal rulemaking).
75

Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).

76

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45
(1984).
77

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 117 (1997). Recently the Supreme Court placed limits on
Auer, precluding greater deference absent genuine ambiguity, and then only where the
agency has relevant expertise and has exercised appropriate judgement. Kisor v. Wilke,
139 S.Ct. 2400 (2019).
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defer to agency fact-finding as well as reasoning in arriving at a decision
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise arbitrary or
capricious.78 Where an agency has expertise but no clear enforcement
authority, courts are nevertheless obliged to give extra weight to the
interpretation according to its persuasiveness.79 Courts even defer to
agencies on whether additional process, due under the Fifth Amendment, is
helpful or burdensome—despite a general commitment to review
constitutional questions de novo: “In assessing what process is due in this
case, substantial weight must be given to the good faith judgments of the
individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare
programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration
of the entitlement claims of individuals.”80
Riddled with caveats and nuances (and a headache for students), these
standards of deference constitute Administrative Law 101. The primary
justification for such deference is very similar to the justification of the
administrative state as a whole: agency expertise. Courts presume that the
agencies are experts in designated policy areas whereas courts are not. That
argument is fortified by the notion that courts owe deference to agencies
because they are entrusted given their expertise to fulfill congressional
mandates. The very reason that Congress can transfer its authority under the
Constitution to another, technical body is, again, the agencies’ particular
ability to accrue expertise and respond with flexibility and precision to
specific problems.
B. Deference to Algorithms?
Much scholarship questions the legality of agency actions using
algorithms. Very little work to date interrogates the ongoing sufficiency of
the justifications underpinning the automated administrative state. Work by
one of us (Citron) has addressed the impact of automation on notice and
choice requirements in agency rulemaking and public participation
generally. Technological Due Process began the work of conceptualizing
automated systems as “de facto delegations of rulemaking power,” arguing
that agencies in essence re-delegate their Congressional authority to
computer programmers.81 And the paper noted—with great concern—the

78

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

79

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).

80

Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1975).

81

Citron, supra, note, at.
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irony that the inevitable changes to policy that come from effectively rewriting written laws via automation should be entitled to zero deference
from courts but in practice will be largely unreviewable.82
A recent paper instead defends the use of certain tools by agencies in
select contexts as consistent with the APA. Cary Coglianese and David
Lehr “consider how nonhuman decision tools would have to be used to
comport with the nondelegation doctrine and with rules about due process,
antidiscrimination, and governmental transparency.”83 The authors dismiss
the concern over delegation on the apparent basis that the necessity of
setting an “objection function,” or goal, for machine learning systems
means that there will always be an “intelligible principle” in the
constitutional sense, and that algorithms lack self-interest, such that
delegating to machines differs from delegating to private parties.84
We question whether an objective function, in the sense of an arbitrary
goal the system seeks to maximize, bears the slightest resemblance to an
intelligence principle directed at agency officials. Yet Coglianese and
Lehr’s analysis is most interesting for what it omits. The authors analyze
machine learning under a doctrine developed to ascertain whether
delegations to people pass constitutional muster. They do not appear to
question whether re-delegating authority to machines in ways that jettison
expertise and discretion might undermine the vary rationale for delegation.
Said another way, Coglianese and Lehr appear to conflate the test itself for
the reasons behind it.
Mulligan and Bamberger come to a different conclusion than
Coglienese and Lehr. Their recent paper focuses on the ways government
adoption of new technology—particularly the artificial intelligence
technique of machine learning—undermines key democratic elements of
administrative governance.85 Citing one of us (Citron), they note that
policymaking requires notice and comment, which procurement of software
systems appears to end-run.86 The authors emphasize in particular the

82

Id.

83

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1154 (2017).
84

Id.

85
See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement As Policy:
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781 (2019).
86

Id.
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“foundational principle that decisions of substance must not be arbitrary or
capricious”—a standard located in the APA.87 The systems the U.S.
government is increasingly procuring yield results no human can justify.
These few works appear to constitute the entirety of the conversation to
date regarding the legitimacy of the automated state as a matter of first
principles.88 Normatively, each work grounds its force in meeting or failing
to meet a doctrinal or statutory requirement.
We believe more needs to be said regarding the fundamental legitimacy
concerns raised by automation. We do not expect or hope to be the final
word on this issue. Our purpose is to marshal argument and evidence
sufficient to touch off a discussion of whether the automated administrative
state is headed for a legitimacy crisis. We see reason to think that it is.
III. THE LOOMING LEGITIMACY CRISIS
The administrative state has been justified for over a century in a
particular way. The argument that automation is eroding agency legitimacy
is conceptual and empirical. The conceptual component is straight forward.
If the administrative state represents a constitutional anomaly justified by
scholars and courts in light of the affordances of bureaucracies—namely,
the accrual of expertise, the potential for individuation and rapid response,
and the exercise of discretion—then the absence of these qualities
undermines that justification. This is especially so where the structural
safeguards that discipline administrative power are being eroded by the
same machine processes. We will make this argument at length below.
The empirical question is different. The empirical question asks whether
and to what extent agencies are, in fact, throwing away expertise and
discretion. Historically this has not been and easy question to answer. And
it remains difficult, given the protections of trade secret,89 the nuances of
“policy by procurement,”90 and the vagaries of administrative law.91 Yet, in
87

Id.

88
In a forthcoming book chapter, Supreme Court of California Justice MarianoFlorentino Cuéllar discusses the trade-offs involved in delegating agency decisions to
machines. He problematizes delegation but does not go so far as to question the theoretical
footing or justification of the administrative state.
89
See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1377–95 (2018).
90

Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note.
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recent years, important gaps have been filled. Litigation across the country
in a diverse array of administrative contexts has revealed a common pattern:
agencies do not understand and cannot control the machines to which they
have delegated their authority.
A. Lessons from Litigation
Due to the courage and diligence of lawyers all over the country, we are
in a better position today than in recent memory to understand the
pathologies of agency automation and its betrayal of the presumption of
agency expertise and flexibility. In the decade since the publication of
Technological Due Process, governments have doubled down on
automation despite its widening problems. The state’s embrace of
automation, however, has not gone unchallenged, for the good of impacted
individuals and scholarly evaluation of the corrosion of expertise,
flexibility, and nimbleness in agency action.
Automation has not been a clear win for governmental efficiency and
fairness as administrators hoped and as vendors claimed. It has not
eliminated bias but rather traded the possibility of human bias for the
guarantee of systemic bias. Prior failures have not informed present efforts.
Instead, problems have multiplied, diversified, and ossified. Government
has expanded automation despite clear warnings about potential pitfalls.
Agencies have continued to use relatively straightforward rules-based
systems despite their obvious flaws. More troublingly, they have adopted
even more complex and even more varied efforts at automated decisionmaking despite proof of concept.92
Automation has misallocated public resources, denied individualized
process, and exacted significant costs on individuals. Automated systems
are hardly engines of efficiency. To the extent that they are predictable, it is
in their misdirection of government services. They impair individualized
process, making decisions about individuals without notice and a chance to

91

Sovereign immunity entitles the government to set the terms of when and if agencies
are sued. The APA waives immunity for some non-monetary (i.e., equitable) relief but
subject to extensive requirements including finality, ripeness, and exhaustion of
administrative remedies. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
92

Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal Artificial Intelligence (U. of Colo. Law
Legal
Studies
Research
Paper,
No.
17-17,
2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932333.
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be heard93 and embedding rules that lack democratic imprimatur.94 They
create instability and uncertainty that upends people’s lives. And they mask
difficult policy choices. If agencies want to make policy choices like cutting
care for certain types of beneficiaries, they ought to say so rather than
burying the problem in an automated system.
In courts across the country, attorneys have challenged government
automation’s pathologies in varied arenas, including public benefits, jobs,
child-welfare, airline travel, and criminal sentencing. Litigation has forced
some government agencies to address glaring problems, but others persist.
Because challenges to systems have wrought ad hoc rather than systemic
change, we have only begun to discover the pathologies of the automated
administrative state. Then too, litigation offers a limited set of tools—it can
only address violations of laws or constitutional commitments already
enshrined in law.
The litigation highlighted shows how far away we have moved from the
animating reasons for agency delegation. It demonstrates that automation
has led to the adoption of inexpert tools that waste government resources
and deny individuals any meaningful form of due process. As the lawsuits
discussed show, automated systems create chaos rather than providing more
nimble and flexible responses.
We have already mentioned the ill-fated system adopted by the
Arkansas Department of Human Services. In Arkansas as in other states,
physically-disabled Medicaid recipients can opt to live at home with statefunded care in lieu of residing in a nursing facility.95 Prior to 2016,
See, e.g., Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan’s
public benefits system erroneously terminated food assistance benefits of more than 20,000
individuals based on crude data matching algorithm in violation of due process guarantees);
Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019) (lawsuit against companies
involved in creation of flawed software that erroneously terminated unemployment benefits
of thousands of Michigan residents); Ryan Felton, Lawsuit challenging Michigan
unemployment fraud cases moves forward, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016, 6:16
PM),
https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2016/03/30/lawsuit-challengingmichigan-unemployment-fraud-cases-moves-forward.
93

See, e.g., Arkansas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup.
Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice).
94

95

AR Choices Provider Manual, 016-06 Ark. Code R. 075, Section 211.000, 213.210;
see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, Ledgerwood et al. v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., Case No 60CV-17-442 (Cir. Ct.
Pulaski Cty.). Home care in Arkansas is on average $18,000 whereas a nursing home
would cost the state $59,000. “Formula of Care” series, WKARK.com (aired Nov. 17,
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registered nurses determined the home-care services available to Medicaid
recipients.96 Nurses interviewed recipients and filled out a 286-question
survey to determine a person’s hours of weekly home care, with a
maximum of fifty-six hours per week.97
In 2016, Arkansas DHS replaced nurse evaluations with algorithmic
decisions. According to DHS administrators, computers would be cheaper
and would not play favorites as nurses might.98 DHS turned to the nonprofit
coalition InterRAI, which licenses its “Resource Utilization Group system”
(RUGs) to agencies across the country.99 In the DHS system, the RUGs
algorithm sorted physically-disabled Medicaid recipients into categories (or
tiers) through a complex series of classifications and statistical
calculations.100 A software vendor hired by DHS then operationalized the
2017),
https://www.kark.com/news/video/formula-for-care-completeseries_20171117191900/859297336.
96

Elder Choices Provider Manual § 212.300(D)(6); AAPD Provider Manual §
212.200(E)(6).
97
See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order, Ledgerwood et al. v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., Case No 60CV-17442, at 15 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cty.).
98

Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE
VERGE
(Mar.
21,
2018,
9:00
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansascerebral-palsy. DHS Administrator Craig Cloud told local news station that the RUGs
algorithm “uses objective standards” and renders “consistent decisions.” See Formula for
Care series, supra note, at.
99
Id. InterRAI’s algorithms “are used in health settings in nearly half of the US states,
as well as in other countries.” Id. InterRAI has a contract with DHS. The nonprofit’s
President Brant Fries serves as the principal investigator on that contract. Excerpted Trial
Transcript at 3, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016). Fries
built an initial version of RUGs pursuant to a seven million dollar grant from the U.S.
Government. Id. at 8. The DHS system uses the RUG III home version, which was written
in January 2009. Id. at 10-11.

Arkansas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 9, 2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice). To say that the RUGs algorithm is complex
understates the point. The testimony of Fries demonstrates the point. Excerpted Trial
Transcript at 11–19, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) (“we
use some fairly sophisticated statistical capability to say . . . . [W]hat explains that this
person costs more than that person. . . . the statistical software looks through thousands of
possibilities and says this is the best one.”). Fries noted, “You have to understand, there’s a
lot of code here. It’s a complicated algorithm. . . . there’s 17 pages of code. Someone took
this code, which is written in a very basic language that any programmer can understand,
but someone has to take this logic and translate it into whatever the software is that the
vendor uses.” Id. at 51.
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decisions. The vendor used the RUGs algorithm to calculate the number of
hours of care allocated to individuals on a weekly basis.101 Medicaid
recipients, once sorted into a tier, could not be moved to another tier even if
their needs changed.102
Once in practice, the new system produced arbitrary and illogical
results.103 If a person was a foot amputee, the RUGs algorithm indicated
that the person had “no foot problems” even though the lack of the limb
meant that they needed more assistance rather than less.104 It ignored crucial
facts about individuals, such as their ability to walk, frequency of falls, and
history of continence.105 It failed to account for the severity of individuals’
conditions even though DHS regulations required an account of such
distinctions.106 For instance, the “algorithm allocates someone with
quadriplegia, dementia, and schizophrenia the same care as someone who
just has quadriplegia, even though the dementia and schizophrenia likely
mean that more care time is needed.”107 Kevin De Liban, counsel for Legal
Aid of Arkansas, astutely coined the phrase “algorithmic absurdities” to
capture these developments.108
In 2016, De Liban sued DHS in federal court on behalf of physicallydisabled Arkansas residents whose home care had been reduced an average
of 43 percent after the adoption of RUGs.109 For one Medicaid recipient, aid
101

Excerpted Trial Transcript at 49, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark.
Oct. 27, 2016) (Testimony of Brant Fries).
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Id.
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Lecher, supra note, at.
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Kevin De Liban, “Algorithm Absurdities—RUGs as Implemented in Arkansas,”
Legal
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of
Arkansas,
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1t2ACNXr7D8JBSLja7F3UC3zkl_qu-xg7. authors).
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Id. at 2.
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Id.
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Lecher, supra note, at. Kevin De Liban did what no DHS official could do. When
DHS officials were stating publicly that they could not explain why the algorithm operated
as it did, De Liban decoded its decisions by comparing the code and master assessment
handbook with the cases of more than 150 people who sought his help. Telephone
Interview with Kevin De Liban (dated April 26, 2019) (notes on file with authors).
Through that process, De Liban found countless problems, including the ones described
above. Id. There could have been far more, but De Liban worked with the clients that he
had to discover the problems that he did. Id.
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was cut more than 56 percent. The algorithmic system left severely disabled
Medicaid recipients alone without access to food, toilet, and medicine for
hours on end.110 Approximately 47 percent of Arkansas Medicaid recipients
were negatively impacted.111
The author of the RUGs algorithm, Brant Fries, testified at trial. During
cross-examination, DeLiban asked Fries to conduct a manual check of
plaintiff Ethel Jacobs’s case. As the author of the algorithm, Fries was
uniquely situated to compare how the code should work and how it actually
worked.112 What Fries found—and what the state’s counsel sheepishly
admitted—was that the RUGs system had made “a mistake” in Jacobs’s
case.113 Plaintiffs’ counsel summed up plaintiffs’ position: “we’re gratified
that DHS has reported the error and certainly happy it’s been found, but that
almost proves the point of the case. There’s this immensely complex system
around which no standards have been published, so no one in their agency
caught it until we initiated federal litigation and spent hundreds of hours
and thousands of dollars to get here today.”114 Fries admitted that there were
likely other mistakes as yet undetected in the system, but offered no
systemic method capable of detecting and addressing them.
De Liban prevailed in court. A federal judge permanently enjoined DHS
from automating home care decisions until it could explain the reasons
behind the decisions.115 After DHS failed to suspend its use of the
algorithmic system in 2017, De Liban sued the agency in state court,
seeking to enjoin its operation on the grounds that its adoption violated the
state’s Administrative Procedure Act. A state judge ordered DHS to stop
using the RUGs algorithm because the agency failed to follow the state’s
drafting his complaint. Interview of De Liban, supra note.
Memorandum Order, Bradley Ledgerwood v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., 60 CV17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2018).
110

111

De Liban Interview, supra note, at (discussing federal lawsuit concerning the Home
Community Based Program).
112

Excerpted Trial Transcript at 21–22, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16CV00119 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) (counsel for Plaintiffs Kevin De Liban) (“DHS is using a system to sort
those folks into 23 categories. That is what Dr. Fries can tell us about, is what it takes. And
our claim around due process is—implicates what knowledge is available about how
people get sorted.”).
113

Id. at 36.

114
Excerpted Trial Transcript at 20, 31, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D.
Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) (testimony of Brant Fries).
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rulemaking procedures. During the rulemaking process, DHS failed to
explain that human decision-makers would be replaced with an automated
system.116
The Arkansas litigation sheds light on the pathologies of today’s
algorithmic decision-making systems. Agencies continue to struggle with
how to give meaningful notice about a computer’s decisions. Despite a
decade of experience, for example, we have not yet figured out how to
provide notice about automated decisions.117
To be clear, Arkansas is not the only state bedeviled by such
“algorithmic absurdities.” Idaho’s health and welfare agency built its own
budget software tool to allocate the number of hours of home care for
disabled Medicaid recipients.118 That algorithmic tool drastically cut
individuals’ home care hours without explanation. The ACLU asked the
agency to account for their clients’ change in benefits. An answer never
arrived. The reason? The algorithm was a “trade secret.”119
The ACLU sued the health agency for injunctive and declaratory relief.
The lawsuit alleged that the agency violated plaintiffs’ due process rights
and that its new decision-making tool produced arbitrary results. According
to plaintiffs’ experts, the system was built on incomplete data and
“fundamental statistical flaws.”120 During discovery, the ACLU deposed

Memorandum Order, Bradley Ledgerwood v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., 60 CV17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2018); see Arkansas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood et
al., 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice). DHS sought to do
an end run around that ruling, issuing an “emergency” rule saying that it was absolved of
having to go through a rulemaking process. The trial court found the effort “manifestly
preposterous” and “disobedient” and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for contempt. Oral order
(dated) (“Effective immediately, the proposed promulgating emergency rule is hereby
enjoined, not based on any new action. It is enjoined as a deliberate and calculated
disobedience of the permanent injunction entered by this court on May 14, 2018.”).
116

117
Lecher, supra note, at (quoting Fries as acknowledging that we don’t have best
practices on how to give notice on how algorithms work and it is “something we should
do”).
118

K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp.3d 703, 708 (D. Idaho 2016).
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Jay Stanley, Pitfalls of Artificial Intelligence Decisionmaking Highlighted in Idaho
ACLU Case, ACLU (Jun. 2, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacytechnology/pitfalls-artificial-intelligence-decisionmaking-highlighted-idaho-aclu-case; see
generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018).
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agency employees about their construction of the algorithmic system.121 As
plaintiffs’ counsel recounts, “everyone pointed a finger at somebody else.”
During the depositions, employees claimed that others were responsible.
“[E]ventually[,] everyone was pointing around in a circle.”122
The court sided with Plaintiffs. The court found that the budget tool’s
unreliability “arbitrarily deprive[d] participants of their property rights and
hence violate[d] due process.”123 As the court explained, the agency built
the tool based on flawed and incomplete information.124 More than 18% of
the
records used to build the tool “contained incomplete or unbelievable
information.”125 The court noted that the agency adopted the budget
software though it knew up to 15% of recipients would not receive adequate
funding.126 The agency knew the software needed to be recalculated and
failed to do so, and it never checked to determine how many participants
were allocated insufficient funds.127
The court urged the parties to “agree upon a plan to improve the [budget
software] tool and institute regular testing to ensure its accuracy.”128 The
agency needed to test the tool to ensure its accuracy and establish a “robust
appeals process where the inevitable errors can be corrected.”129 The court
further found that notice provided recipients violated due process because it
gave recipients no explanation for the cut in benefits so that they could not
challenge the reduction.130
Opaque algorithms decide whether public employees can keep their jobs
and provide little way for employees to understand why or to protest. Cities
and states use algorithmic systems to evaluate public school teachers.131
121
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Id.
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K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F.Supp.3d 703, 718 (D. Idaho 2016).
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Id. at 711.
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Id. at 714.
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Id. at 720.
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AI Now, Litigating Algorithms; Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic
Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE. J. L. TECH. 103 (2018).
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Typically, those systems known as “value-added appraisal” systems are
built by private vendors. The algorithms compare test scores of students at
the beginning and end of a school year as a way to measure the students’
progress and supposedly are “adjusted to try to account for factors other
than teacher effectiveness, such as socioeconomic status, that might be
responsible for the students’ progress or lack thereof. The adjusted results
for the students that are taught by a particular teacher are then used to
produce an evaluation of that teacher’s effectiveness.”132
Starting in 2011, as Houston school district used a “value-added”
appraisal system provided by a private vendor SAS to assess teacher
performance.133 The system measured teacher efficacy by endeavoring to
track the teacher’s impact on student test scores over time.134 Generally
speaking, a teacher’s algorithmic score was based on comparing the average
growth of student test scores of the particular teacher compared to the
statewide average.135 The score was converted to a test statistic called the
“Teacher Gain Index,” which classified teachers into five levels of
performance, ranging from “well above” to “well below” average.136
Initially used to determine teacher bonuses, the algorithmic system was
used to sanction employees for low student performance on standardized
tests. In 2012, the school district declared a goal of ensuring that “no more
than 15% of teachers with ratings of ineffective are retained.”137 It followed
suit—by 2014, approximately 25% of “ineffective teachers were
‘exited.’”138
The teachers’ union sued the school district on due process grounds,
arguing that the teachers could not examine the algorithm in order to
challenge its accuracy. Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin the school
district’s use of the scores in the termination or nonrenewal of contracts, a
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Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 YALE. J. L. TECH. 103 (2018)
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Hous. Fed. Teachers v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp.3d 1168, 1172 (S.D.
Tex. 2017).
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constitutionally protected property interest.139 The court found a due
process violation because teachers had no way to replicate and challenge
their scores.
The court noted its concern about the algorithm’s accuracy. As the court
point out, the school district never verified or audited the system. The court
noted that “when a public agency adopts of policy of making high stakes
employment decisions based on secret algorithms incompatible with
minimum due process, the proper remedy is to overturn the policy, while
leaving the trade secrets intact.”140
As the court underscored and as the defendant conceded, scores might
contain errors, including data entry mistakes and code glitches, which will
not be promptly corrected.141 The court explained that “Algorithms are
human creations, and subject to error like any human endeavor.” The court
expressed concern that the entire system was fraught with inaccuracies
given the “house-of-cards fragility of the EVAAS system”—the “wrong
score of a single teacher could alter the scores of every other teacher in the
district.”142 Thus, “the accuracy of one score hinges upon the accuracy of
all.”143
In a challenge brought by a public-school teacher in New York, a state
trial court found that the value-added appraisal model was arbitrary and
capricious.144 The court highlighted the biases and statistical shortcomings
of the system and noted the lack of transparency such that the plaintiff could
not understand what she needed to do to achieve a satisfactory score.
Michigan’s unemployment benefits system is another case in point.
Before 2013, the Michigan Unemployment Agency had 400 staffers who
oversaw unemployment claims. Staffers relied on a legacy IT system to
139

Id. at 1174.

140

Id. at 1179.

141

Id. at 1177.

142

Id. at 1178.

Id. The court dismissed the substantive due process claim because the “loose
constitutional standard of rationality allows government to use blunt tools which may
produce marginal results.” The court explained that the algorithmic scoring system would
pass muster under the rationality inquiry even if they are accurate only a little over half of
the time. Id. at 1182.
143
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Matter of Lederman v. King, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26416 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10,

2016).
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administer claims and to check for fraud.145 In 2011, the Michigan
legislature eliminated the requirement that the state’s Unemployment
Insurance Agency (Agency) obtain a court order before seizing a claimant’s
wages, tax refunds, and bank funds. The Agency seized on the chance to
replace its system with a fully automated one.146 According to officials, an
automated system would enhance efficiency by eliminating the jobs of onethird of agency’s staff.147 It promised to identify fraudulent employment
filings efficiently.148
The Agency spent 45 million dollars on the Michigan Integrated Data
Automated System (MiDAS), working with a vendor to build the system.149
MiDAS went live in October 2013. In short order, the number of persons
accused of unemployment fraud “grew five-fold in comparison to the
average number found using the old system.”150 In two years, more than
34,000—up to 50,000—people were accused of fraud. Only seven percent
of those thousands of individuals had actually committed fraud.151
MiDAS charged those accused a 400% penalty of the claimed amount
of fraud plus penalties and interest.152 Once claims were substantiated
through a flimsy notice process, MiDAS garnished the wages, tax refunds,
and bank accounts of the accused. In its first year, MiDAS generated $69
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Robert N. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm Alchemy
Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018).
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Id.; Memorandum of Professor H. Luke Shaefer and Michigan Unemployment
Insurance Project Manager Steve Grey to U.S. Department of Labor Administrator Gay
Gilbert
(dated
May
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2015),
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/document
s/Shaefer-Gray-USDOL-Memo_06-01-2015.pdf.
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Jack Lessneberry, State unemployment computer had anything but the golden
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million in fines from alleged fraud, up from $3 million the year before.153
Michigan lawmakers have promised to seek at least $30 million in
compensation for those falsely accused.154
If MiDAS identified discrepancies between information provided by
claimants and information accessible to the system including employer and
state agency records, then it would find fraud.155 MiDAS also “flagged
claimants through an ‘income spreading’ formula, which calculated a
claimant’s income in a fiscal quarter and averaged the claimant’s weekly
earnings, even if the person did not actually make any money in a given
week.”156 MiDAS automatically determined a claimant engaged in fraud if
the employee reported no income for any week during a quarter in which
the claimant earned income.157
At least 90% of the MiDAS fraud determinations were inaccurate. Part
of the problem was that MiDAS was mining corrupt or inaccurate data. For
instance, a consultant report found that MiDAS has trouble converting data
from the legacy system.158 MiDAS also could not read information scanned
into the system.159 Also problematic was the inaccuracies raised by the
“income spreading” formula. The Agency made no effort to check the
system’s findings.160
The implications were profound. Once MiDAS flagged fraud through a
web portal that many people did not check, the state garnished people’s
wages, federal and state income tax refunds, and bank accounts.161 The
Agency used these collection techniques without giving claimants an
opportunity to contest the fraud determinations. As alleged in an ongoing
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suit against agency officials, the Agency “made no attempt to consider the
facts or circumstances of a particular case, or determine whether the alleged
fraud was intentional, negligent, or accidental.”162
Litigation surfaced much of the damning evidence. In April 2015,
plaintiffs brought a class action against the Agency, alleging that the
MiDAS “robo-adjudications” violated their due process rights.163 Plaintiffs
sought to enjoin the Agency from future constitutional violations and to
require it to maintain proper procedures for determining fraud. The
complaint alleged that MiDAS never informed claimants about the basis for
the Agency’s finding of fraud. Under the terms of the settlement, the
Agency agreed to review all fraud determinations made by MiDAS and to
stop all collection activities including wage garnishments and tax return
seizures for claimants who received fraud determinations at the hands of
MiDAS.164 A class of plaintiffs has sued agency officials in their individual
capacity as well as the vendor who helped built the system.165 That case is
ongoing.
Five months later, the Agency ceased using MiDAS for fraud
determinations after being sued by the federal government. The state
apologized for the false claims for unemployment fraud. In August 2017,
the Agency completed a review of fraud cases and reversed 70% of them,
promising to refund $21 million dollars to claimants.
MiDAS, like other malfunctioning government systems, created havoc.
People had to hire lawyers to fight the false fraud accusations.166 Many
could not afford counsel and had to fight the allegations alone, to little
effect.167 They suffered economic instability.168 Some people had to declare

162

Id. at 894.
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Complaint, Zynda v. Zimmer, No. 2:15-CV-11449 (filed E.D. Mi. April 21, 2015).

164

Id.

165

Cahoo et al. v. SAS Analytics, 912 F.3d 887 (6 th Cir. 2019).
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Memorandum of Professor H. Luke Shaefer and Michigan Unemployment
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Gilbert
(dated
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2015),
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/document
s/Shaefer-Gray-USDOL-Memo_06-01-2015.pdf (discussing case of Barbara Hills who was
erroneously accused of committing fraud on ten occasions, all for the same underlying
mistake, and she had to protest each determination separately).
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bankruptcy.169 Some had their homes foreclosed, and some “were made
homeless.”170 People’s credit scores suffered after their wages were
garnished and tax refunds seized.171 The financial harm exacted may exceed
$100 million.172 Virginia Eubanks rightly argues that government decision
making systems create a “digital poorhouse.”173
At the federal level, there are glimpses of similar phenomena.
Algorithmic determinations have led to the erroneous seizure of people’s
federal income tax refunds and the garnishment of their wages. They have
led to the wrongful suspension of people’s Social Security benefits. 174 But
an especially dramatic example deals with the ability of Americans to
travel.
For many years now, the “No Fly” computer matching system has
targeted innocent people as terrorists without a meaningful chance to
exonerate themselves.175 The No-Fly List “prevents listed individuals from
boarding commercial aircraft.”176 Individuals were denied the right to fly;
others were detained at airports; still others were arrested.177 The “No Fly”
data-matching program misidentified individuals because it used crude
algorithms that could not distinguish between similar names.178 Thousands
of people got caught in the dragnet, including government officials, military
veterans, and toddlers.179 The U.S. government would not say if one was on
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the list and provided no explanation for no-fly decisions.180
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit held that the composition of watchlists
warranted judicial review. The court noted: “Just how would an appellate
court review the agency’s decision to put a particular name on the list?
There was no hearing before an administrative law judge; there was no
notice-and-comment procedure. For all we know, there is no administrative
record of any sort for us to review. So if any court is going to review the
government’s decision to put [plaintiff] on the No-Fly List, it makes sense
that it be a court will the ability to take evidence.”181
Ever since then, litigation has had a modest impact on the watchlist
problem. In those cases, discovery was often short circuited by claims of
executive privilege or state secrets privilege. In a suit brought by the
ACLU, thirteen U.S. citizen plaintiffs (including several military veterans)
alleged that the No-Fly List prevented them from air travel.182 The FBI
offered to take some of the plaintiffs off the list if they became government
informants.183 The federal court found that the No-Fly list violated the
plaintiffs’ due process rights, but refused to dictate a suitable process.184
The court ordered the government to “fashion new procedures that
provide plaintiffs with the requisite due process . . . without jeopardizing
national security.”185 The court ordered the government to disclose to the
plaintiffs their status on the watchlist.186 Seven of the thirteen plaintiffs
were informed that they were not on the watchlist.
And yet, as Jeffrey Kahn explains, “watchlists are now an established
feature in the country’s national security architecture, as natural to a
generation of Americans born after 9/11 as submitting to a search at the
airport.”187 Anyone who remains on the no-fly list will be unable to get
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meaningful notice and a chance to be heard.188 The government still refuses
to explain why someone appears on the list, though people can file a
“redress form” to get themselves removed from the list. Barry Friedman
astutely notes, “This sort of Kafkaesque nightmare should scare all of us,
right down to our anklebones.”189
People frequently experience “punishing personal trauma” in the wake
of erroneous automate decision.190 In November 2004, Dr. Rahinah
Ibrahim, an accomplished architect and academic, was mistakenly included
on the No-Fly List.191 She was arrested, detained, and denied return to the
U.S. despite twenty years of legal residency. Ten years later, a federal
district court judge concluded that she should never have been included on
the No-Fly List. The judge captured her suffering in this way: “This was an
error with palpable impact, leading to the humiliation, cuffing, and
incarceration of an innocent and incapacitated air traveler.”192
B. Undermining Functionalism
This emerging record, taken together, paints a distributing picture of
unforced errors and gaps in understanding and accountability. Recall again
the rationale of scholars and justices in support of the administrative state.
The legislature commits its authority under broad delegations of power to
agencies because agencies have the requisite expertise and flexibility to
govern a complex and evolving world.
But agency officials do not appear to understand the systems they have
commissioned to carry out this task. Crucially, they cannot explain them in
public or in court because they do not know how they work. Whatever
expertise that officials hold gets translated—ostensibly--into software
language that officials have neither learned to speak nor have any bona fides
to speak. Having encoded agency rules in automated software systems,
officials cannot exercise discretion any more than members of the
legislature. To the extent conditions change—either fiscal, normative,
scientific, or otherwise—the official is not in a position to adapt.
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In Arkansas, neither agency officials nor third party providers are able
to articulate how to debug their system, despite the profound consequences
for disabled residents. In Iowa, benefits were automatically terminated or
reduced without an adequate evidentiary basis. Agency officials point the
finger and third-party vendors, who pointed it right back. In Texas, a court
referred to an algorithmic system by which to assess public teacher
performance as a “house of cards” that was riddled with uncorrectable
errors.193 In Michigan, a fraud detection system was inaccurate 90% of the
time, leading the agency to reverse 70% of determinations.194 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the government to fashion new procedures
around the No-Fly List, which have yet to be developed.195
The administration law literature astutely addresses, in Jody Freedman
and Martha Minow’s words, “government by contract.”196 The U.S.
government relies extensively on third party private contractors to carry out
its responsibilities, particularly in the military and intelligence sectors.197
Contractors are more difficult to supervise and hold accountable than
government employees.198 They have been known to waste government
resources or engage in outright fraud.199 Semi-private parties imbued with
sovereign authority can undermine democratic norms and diminish the
capacity of government itself to respond to citizen concerns.200
These concerns are neither overblown nor adequately addressed. Yet
193
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they differ substantially from the trends in agency automation. The
privatization debate concerns which expert is entrusted to carry out the will
of the public. In some quarters, an excessive reliance on semi-private third
parties threatens constitutional safeguards and erodes sovereign
legitimacy.201 Nonetheless, contractors—whether technically public or
private employees—are capable of acting as repositories of expertise in the
agency sense. Contractors are often former government employees, which
gives them bona fides in their bids for government work.202 Relying on
subject-matter expertise, they can still exercise discretion, give reasons for
decisions, and respond to evolving needs or circumstances.
The administrative state’s turn toward automation is troubling for the
absence of such expertise and flexibility. The questions we raise are not
about which expert is appropriate but rather whether the absence of
expertise undermines the legitimacy of the automated administrative state.
Software systems designed, adopted, and deployed today lack the benefits
of expertise almost entirely.
A number of caveats are in order. We know about the examples above
because they have resulted in litigation.203 Automated systems that litigants
challenge presumably represent the outer bounds of egregious agency
action. At the same time, it is possible that these egregious failures may
represent the tip of the iceberg. That courts enjoined these systems does
show that the judiciary is capable of oversight to some degree.
The examples from ligation to date tend to involve state agencies, not
federal ones. Presumably the justifications for state agencies mirror those
for federal ones. There are also federal examples, such as the No-Fly List.
Other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have similar
struggles.204 The APA, meanwhile, imposes significant restrictions as to
201
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timing and venue for challenging federal agency action, which state law
may not, such that challenge federal systems may be more onerous.205 We
do know, however, that federal agencies are making increasing use of
algorithms and automation as a matter of fact and official policy.
Importantly, there are, in theory, existing pathways for agency officials
to reintroduce and reclaim their expertise, discretion, and flexibility.
Agency officials could become experts in the systems they administer, and
those systems could be built in such a way so as to preserve discretion and
respond to changing conditions in real time (e.g., through software updates).
We are skeptical given two decades of evidence, but it is analytically
possible and worthy of further exploration. Several recent works we
mention take this approach. Kroll and his coauthors develop a set of legal
and technical principles, borrowed from the realm of engineering, that they
imagine as capable of restoring transparency and accountability to
administrative and other government decision-making.206 In a lengthy
section entitled “Informing agency deliberation with technical expertise,”
Mulligan and Bamberger offer an extensive vision for reintroducing
technical expertise into procurement and other important government
processes.207
Nevertheless, the more agencies automate under the current modus
operandi, the more they undermine the premise of the administrative state.
Agencies deserve the power they possess based on their expertise,
flexibility, and nimbleness. This is true at a pragmatic level but also at the
level of first principles. Agencies that automate throw away expertise and
discretion with both hands. Automation also thwarts structural requirements
such as the APA and meaningful judicial oversight.
Meanwhile, agencies waste money rather than make the gains in
efficiency or anti-biasing that justified the turn to automation in the first
place. If this trend holds or accelerates, it is high time for scholars and
society to question not only whether process guarantees are sufficient, but
whether the entire enterprise is justified in the first instance. Congress
seems as capable of contracting with software vendors to automate
205
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enforcement. A Congress of machines has no need for a middle person.
IV. TOWARD A NEW VISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
Let us summarize the argument so far. In recent years, we have seen an
acceleration of a concerning trend towards inexpert, flawed automation.
Administrative agencies have increasingly turned to automation to make
consequential, binding decisions about the Americans they govern. The
trend has not gone unnoticed; as a rich, interdisciplinary literature
evidences, the automation of the administrative state threatens important
values such as participation and due process. This Article contributes to this
discussion by developing a challenge to the automated administrative state
at the level of justification: an overreliance on algorithms and software
undermines the very rationale for quasi legislative bureaucracies. Recent
litigation in particular paints a vivid picture of agency officials who lack
expertise in the systems that employ, cannot give reasons for binding
agency actions, and throw away the individualized discretion that justifies
the administrative state in the first instance.
The present state of affairs invites a variety of reactions. Above we
alluded to an ongoing project that responds to automation’s disruption of
rights and values through a combination of legal and technical reforms.
These include creating “transparent systems and assigning limited
procedure and substantive rights” (Schwartz),208 developing a full-throated
conception of “open code governance”209 and “technological due process”
(Citron),210 reimaging fair hearings211 and treating machines as state actors
(Crawford and Schultz),212 and developing “technological tools for
procedural regularity” (Kroll et. al).213
As discussed, these responses largely involve restoring the status quo ex
ante, shoring up eroded rights and values as opposed to re-examining and
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justifying the administrative state in toto. Some academics and especially
activists in recent years have married this call to restore rights and values
with demands for a moratorium or ban on the use of automation by
government agencies unless or until its many deficiencies can be
addressed.214
One response to claims of agency illegitimacy is to try to address the
shortfalls piecemeal through legal and technical design. A second response
with a long pedigree is to urge a dramatic reduction in the administrative
state itself. This is the approach of David Schoenbrod in Power Without
Responsibility, which conceptualizes the administrative state as a kind of
political laundering operation whereby Congress seeks to influence the
world while shielding itself from accountability.215 It is the approach of
Philip Hamburger in Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, which aims to
counter the narrative that “binding administrative power is … a novelty,
which developed in response to the necessities of modern life.”216 For
Hamburger and others, the administrative state represents a complex play
for absolute power and hence tyranny. The proper response to political
laundering or the “revival of absolute power” is to adhere closely to the text
of the Constitution, dismantle the administrative state, and force Congress
to do the legislating.217 This is a fortiori true in an automated administrative
state, wherein agencies commit a significant portion of their power to still
less accountable third parties that design the systems agencies deploy.
We are sympathetic to, and have deeply engaged with, the first project.
To the extent the adoption of technology by the state has eroded civil rights
and values, those rights and values should be restored or else the technology
should be abandoned. Yet as framed, neither the critique nor the
recommendations cut deep enough. Even were it possible somehow to
design legal and technical systems capable of fully restoring due process to
automated decision-making, a wholesale turn to automation by the agency
officials could still undermine the justification for the administrative state
through the displacement of expertise and discretion. But more importantly,
214

Pasquale, supra note.

215

SCHOENBROD, supra note.

216

HAMBERGER, supra note.

217

Id. Presumably these authors would not completely dismantle the administrative
state, but rather limit its capacities as much as possible to executive functions. Moreover,
the Necessary and Proper and other clauses of the Constitution expressly mention
Departments and Officers of government, such that even a strict textualist reading must
envision some level of bureaucracy.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590

42

THE AUTOMATED ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

[27-Feb-20

the availability of new technological affordances invites an additional,
important question: is the status quo even sufficient? Put simply, shouldn’t
the availability of better tools lead to higher standards for governance?
We are less sympathetic to the second project, at least at a practical
level. Conceptually we understand that a large and expensive bureaucracy
maintained at public expense, lacking justification even under a
functionalist interpretation of the Constitution, should not be sustained. But
the most plausible reason that the administrative state has turned to
automation in the first place is resource constraints. 218 Due in large measure
to a political economy that has systematically underfunded and deempowered the administrative state, agencies struggle to meet the enormous
needs and expectations of the populace. “We blame the Department of
Motor Vehicles for long lines at the counters,” Jerry Mashaw writes, “not
the legislatures that refuses to fund additional personnel and equipment.”219
We would not abandon the administrative state, and the many people who
rely upon it, on the basis that agencies have been channeled by sustained
political and economic forces into desperate measures that undermine their
legitimacy.
Ultimately, we prefer a third response, one that neither lets agencies off
the hook for their often devastatingly poor choices around technology, nor
forces agencies to abandon technology altogether on pain of political
extinction. We hope in this final section to lay out a positive vision for how
the administrative state might engage with new technology more wisely,
beginning to re-justify itself in light of new affordances and otherwise
update its mission for the twenty-first century. This positive program
involves, at base, the deliberate and self-conscious adoption of technology
to the extent it furthers the rationales for delegating authority and power to
agencies and not otherwise.
The pathologies of the automated administrative state—discussed in
detail above—have a common feature. When agencies displace human
wisdom and expertise in favor of systems that automatically confer or deny
benefits and rights, disaster seems always around the corner. Harmless
people are barred from travel. Disabled individuals receive no or fewer
health services, falling well short of their needs. Teachers and other public
218

For a lengthy discussion, see generally Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending
Assault on the Administrative State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599 (2018).
219

Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things like Reasons are Put in a Jar: Reason and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17 (2001).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590

27-Feb-20]

THE AUTOMATED ADMNISTRATIVE STATE

43

employees lose their jobs or cannot advance in their careers. In the
analogous criminal context, defendants—particularly racial minorities—
spend longer in prison or jail due to a perceived risk. Meanwhile,
administrative officials charged by society to oversee these systems do not
understand how they work, let alone feel empowered to second-guess or
override them. And addressing the high prevalence of mistakes has so many
costs that promised gains in efficiency are never realized.
This mismanagement and suffering are all the more perverse as it takes
place amidst the perception that we live in age of technical wonders. Even
as we write, techniques of artificial intelligence are transforming the way
people live, work, and play. Two or more people who speak any of a
hundred different languages can communicate with one another in real-time
through language translation systems.220 Algorithms parse billions of
financial transactions and emails to detect fraud and spam.221 Machine
learning helps doctors diagnose patients and weather forecasters develop
faster, more accurate, and more detailed models.222 Enormous, crossdisciplinary research initiatives—such as the eScience Institute anchored at
the University of Washington—fuel data-driven discovery across an array
of fields.223
The modern American administrative state is well over a hundred years
old. Although we decry the actual deployment of automated software
systems by agencies to date, we would not deny our government the
technological affordances of the twenty-first century. As a diverse set of
scholars have begun to observe, agencies can and sometimes do bring
advances in information technology constructively to bear on the incredibly
complex task of regulation and governance. Writing for the journal Nature
with Kate Crawford in 2016, one of us (Calo) highlighted the potential to
deploy machine learning by law enforcement to help identify officers at risk
of excessive force.224 Just such a system was deployed by the CharlotteMecklenburg Police the same year in collaboration with a large,
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interdisciplinary team from seven major research universities, leading to
greater predictive accuracy, more targeted interventions, and lower
instances of misconduct.225
We are not alone in this position. British philosopher Helen Margetts and
economist Cosmina Dorobantu point to the capacity of technology to help
governments personalize information and services for constituents, offering
examples in Queensland, Australia and New Zealand.226 California
Supreme Court Justice and Stanford Law professor Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar imagines a role for machine translation services in discharging the
obligation of federal and state courts to provide interpreters where, as often,
a lack of available interprets for defendants or witnesses can mean long
delays of justice.227 In their aforementioned defense of “regulating by
robot,” Coglianese and Lehr cite to the use of machine learning to predict
chemical toxicities and sort the mail.228 These are just a few examples.229
We do not mean to endorse all or any of these specific use cases. Each
could raise concerns; artificially intelligence systems have their inevitable
flaws, and all technology is developed and deployed against a backdrop of
long-standing social, economic, and political inequities.230 In 2017, the
social media giant Facebook’s bespoke system mistranslated the phrase
“good morning” in Arabic, posted by a Palestinian worker leaning against a
bulldozer in a West Bank settlement, to “hurt them” in English and “attack
them” in Hebrew.231 The post led the man to be arrested and questioned by
225

Samuel Carton et al., Identifying Police Officers at Risk of Adverse Events, KDD
’16, August 13 - 17, 2016, San Francisco, CA, USA. Asked about the system, Frank
Pasquale, among the staunchest critic of algorithmic decision-making, told New Scientist:
“In many walks of life, I think this algorithmic ranking of workers has gone too far—it
troubles me. But in the context of police, I think it could work.”
226

Helen Margetts & Cosmina Dorobantu, Comment, Rethink government with AI, 568
NATURE 163, 164 (2019).
227

Cuéllar, supra note.

228

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1162–63 (2017).
229
Other examples in the recent literature include (1) improving emergency response,
(2) locating unregistered voters, (3) better targeting of inspections, (4) detecting judicial
bias, and (5) improving international trade.
230

See Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where fairness fails: data, algorithms, and the limits
of antidiscrimination discourse, INFO., COMM. & SOC. 22:7, 900-915 (2019).
Alex Hern, Facebook translates ‘good morning’ into ‘attack them,’ leading to
arrest, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2017).
231

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590

27-Feb-20]

THE AUTOMATED ADMNISTRATIVE STATE

45

Israeli police—no doubt a deeply fraught experience in light of the context.
Similar concerns could arise in virtually any application of artificial
intelligence by government or industry.
We nevertheless note a difference in the character and orientation of these
interventions from the automated systems discussed in Part II. Specifically,
these potential interventions are oriented toward the furthering of
substantive commitments and values, such as access, quality, and selfassessment. They are not designed simply to save costs (and in the process
undermine procedural commitments without garnering more efficiency) but
rather to enhance the capabilities of the administrative state itself—both
agencies and officials—to engage in more effective and fair governance. In
general, they would not outsource agency functions requiring expertise and
discretion to third parties whose software and hardware deliver neither.
These efforts have potential to enhance the justification of the bureaucratic
state by, ideally, generating knowledge, enhancing expertise, tailoring
outcomes, and increasing responsiveness—the purported reasons Congress
created agencies to carry out its will in the first place.
One of the areas ripe for change is in understanding the effects of policy
interventions in complex environments; new technological affordances may
open the door to less muddling and more modeling. In a classic 1959 article,
The Science of “Muddling Through,”232 political economist Charles
Linblom develops the argument that administrators cannot and do not arrive
at the “best” policy prescription in any given context for several reasons.
Notably, human beings are incapable of ascertaining and processing all of
the information they would need to calibrate an optimal policy intervention,
even assuming unlimited time.
What Linblom calls the “root” method of policymaking, whereby
policymakers ascertain and maximize values in a single exercise, is
impossible for real people. In his words:
Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be
practiced except for relatively simple problems and even then
only in a somewhat modified form. It assumes intellectual
capabilities and sources of information that men simply do not
possess, and it is even more absurd an approach to policy when
Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’ 19 Pub. Admin. R. 79
(1959). It is hard to overstate the influence of Linblom’s paper. It has among the most
citations of any article on the topic of policy, let alone public administration, in the English
language.
232

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590

46

THE AUTOMATED ADMINISTRATIVE STATE

[27-Feb-20

the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is
limited, as is always the case.233
Although the overwhelming majority of public administration literature
contemplates the root method, no public administrator deploys it in practice.
Rather, public administrators follow a “branch” method instead.234
According to the branch method, which embraces “successive limited
comparisons” over a “rational-comprehensive” approach, the administrator
sets a specific goal and attempts to ascertain how to advance it in
isolation.235 Having deployed a particular intervention, the administrator
monitors its effects, adjusting with new interventions each time the target or
another value is compromised in the real world.
Linblom recognized the inevitability of the branch method and
formalized its application. Rather than exclude important factors
haphazardly through ignorance, as the root method inevitably does, the
branch method focuses on a single value at a time and then iterates.
Throughout his important piece, Lindblom relies again and again on the
affordances of his contemporaries. The root method is a futile attempt at
“superhuman comprehensiveness.”236 It calls for an analysis “beyond
human capacity.”237 Administrators, being people, must muddle through.
The intervening decades have not resulted, as even some of Linblom’s
contemporaries predicted, in the creation of an artificial superintelligence.
Yet it cannot be gainsaid that the machines—and therefore, the humans—of
today are dramatically better at modeling multifaceted behaviors and effects
than in the late 1950s. This capacity to parse extreme complexity through a
combination of advances in statistical methods and greater computational
processing power has been further enhanced in recent years by techniques
of artificial intelligence.238 The upshot is that contemporary institutions,
including state and federal agencies, have access to far greater means by
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which to simulate a given regulatory context. Some units of government,
such as the Center for Disease Control, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, and U.S. military, have long capitalized on
this new affordance.239 Many other units have largely ignored it.240
We do not predict that technology will somehow overcome all of the
limitations of the root method that Linblom identifies. For example,
machines may be no better than officials at ascertaining unregistered
citizens preferences. And machines rely upon people to choose their inputs
and goals.241 Computer models can enshrine deeply problematic
assumptions into policy while harboring pretensions of impartiality.
Science, technology, and society scholar Kevin Baker offers the example of
SimCity, a software-based game that came to inform urban planning.242
SimCity looked open-ended but in fact embedded the assumptions of the
libertarian Jay Forrester in Urban Dynamics that growth should come at all
costs and nearly all government interventions in the market backfire.243
Over time, however, administrators may increasingly learn to model
through instead of muddling forward. Meanwhile, unlike the reflexive
automation of benefits through software, the generation of complex models
of specific industries and spheres of life continues to require expertise in
those contexts. Agency officials that model through are still making the
ultimate decision about whether and when to intervene in humans’ lives and
environments. Alternatively, we might conceive of an interdisciplinary
body to act as a repository for knowledge about modeling itself that can
lend technical assistance across government.244
In endorsing agency deployment of new technological affordances to
meet a more stringent standard of public administration and service, we
acknowledge various limitations. Most notably, it seems non-trivial to draw
defensible lines between offensive and inefficient automation on the one
hand, and other, beneficial uses of new affordances that further legitimacy
239
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on the other. Although an inaccurate model of the world is not selfexecuting in the same way as a benefits algorithm, agencies could succumb
to well-evidenced automation bias and over-rely on faulty computer
conclusions in predicting the effects of intervention.245
We are keenly aware of the limitations of the affordances we explore,
limitations that have often inured to the detriment of the most vulnerable.
As agencies turn algorithmic tools inward to gain awareness of concerning
practices by police or other officials, there is a danger they will
disproportionately identify people of color as candidates for intervention
just as the use of “heat maps” lead disproportionately to police encounters
with innocent people of color.246 As Charles Reich warned more than fifty
years ago, systematization of data collection and surveillance in the
administrative state inevitably exacted profound costs to the poor and
marginalized.247
We are also aware that even mere automation can have benefits. In
theory, by automating menial tasks agencies could free up resources and
personnel to deal with the needs of the public on a more individualized
basis. There is a reason that administrative, civil, criminal, and even
constitutional procedure places an emphasis on efficiency. Government
could create a perfect system for the lucky few that never made any
errors.248 But then justice would be delayed for, and hence denied, to many
others.249 In a world of constrained resources, greater efficiency translates
into greater access.
Our point is more basic. The American administrative state has, to date,
systemically eroded its legitimacy by adopting technological systems that
undermine the very qualities that justify agencies to begin with. The proper
lodestar for adopting new technical tools is not merely that they come with
a failsafe against trammeling civil liberties. Agencies should look for
245
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technical ways to enhance the expertise, discretion, and capacity for
individualization that justifies committing such significant public power to
bureaucratic entities in the first place. Even apart from justification, the
literature should consider whether the new software and algorithms
available to agencies should ratchet up societal expectations. Today’s
agencies today should be doing more with more, not less.
CONCLUSION
At various points in American history, scholars, lawmakers, and courts
have debated the legitimacy of the administrative state. Arguably at odds
with the tripartite structure of the Constitution, the agencies regulating our
daily lives have nevertheless been on firm footing for a long time—in
reverence to their critical role in governing a complex, evolving society.
More specifically, agencies are said to be repositories of expertise in the
contexts and people they regulate. They promise more rapid and
individualized response to evolving conditions. And, in any event, they are
limited and channeled by safeguards, from their organic statute, to the APA,
to the courts.
Many state and federal agencies have in recent decades embraced a
novel mode of operation: automation. Were the present trend to hold, we
should expect more and more reliance on software and algorithms by
agencies in carrying out their delegated responsibilities. Already this
automated administrative state has been shown to be riddled with concerns.
In particular, legal challenges in state and federal court regarding the denial
of benefits and rights—from travel to disability—have revealed a pernicious
pattern of cruel, sometimes bizarre outcomes.
The legal academy has been attentive to these developments, but in a
particular way. A literature dating back many years explores the pitfalls of
automation from the perspective of due process and other denials of rights
and values. There have been wise suggestions to intervene through changes
to law and the design of systems in order to restore the status quo, displaced
and disrupted by the introduction of software and algorithms.
Largely missing from this conversation, however, are broader, structural
critiques of the legitimacy of agencies. As unfolding litigation across the
country shows, automated systems in the administrative state highlight the
extent to which agency officials have redelegated their responsibilities to
third-party systems that are little understood even by their creators. As
agencies throw away the very qualities that justify their authority, it is fair
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to begin to question whether and why they retain legitimacy to carry out the
will of the legislature.
Our answer is not to dismantle the administrative state. Instead, we
urge critic thinking about why agencies find themselves in this position—
for example, the chronic lack of resources best laid at the feet of the
legislature or executive. Nor should agencies abandon tools of the twentyfirst century. Rather, the proper response to a pending legitimacy crisis
within the administrative state is to furnish a better lodestar for when to
develop and deploy technology. Agencies should procure new tools if and
only if they enhance, rather than undermine, agency claims of being better
situated than the legislature to govern daily life.
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